ABSTRACT Diagrammatic methodologies for modeling information security attacks have been developed in various forms (e.g. attack trees, use cases, and misuse cases) and applied for many purposes (e.g. security requirements specifi cation and identifi cation of commonly occurring attack patterns). They play an important role in the development of more effective communication between technical and nontechnical participants than that made possible by text. Recently, Unifi ed Modeling Language (UML) sequence diagrams have been used to model security attacks (e.g. collision attacks and unintelligent replay attacks) in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs require protection to preserve the confi dentiality and integrity of sensitive information as well as availability of the system. This is an important research issue because WSNs are used in critical applications such as military battlefi eld surveillance, industrial process monitoring and control, and machine health monitoring. This paper describes an alternative fl ow-based approach for visualizing security attacks in terms of depiction of behavioral interactions. It models security attacks in WSNs and contrasts this method with the sequence-based diagrammatic method. The comparison provides an initial appraisal of the technique with reference to a well-known process modeling methodology. The results indicate that the method can capture the interweaving of attack events to achieve a more complete and detailed picture necessary for better understanding.
INTRODUCTION
The process of modeling involves artifi cial language used to express systems in an organized and methodologically interpreted way to capture the structural meaning of a system. The language can be in the form of diagrammatic representation of concepts and their relationships, with the representation built on visual depictions of activities, events, fl ow controls, functions, applications, actors, and their interactions.
It has been shown that such visualization offers signifi cant benefi ts by providing an instrument for documentation, communication, and management purposes. In software engineering, visual notations are used extensively, in specifying requirements, design, and implementation. They play an important role in the development of more effective communication between technical and nontechnical participants than is possible with text [1] . Extensive research has been conducted in computer science with respect to the fi eld of visualization; nevertheless, defi ciencies still exist in the tools and methods used for capturing complex processes diagrammatically.
According to Moody [2] , Visual notations are pervasively used in software engineering [SE] , and have dominated both research and practice since its earliest beginnings. The fi rst SE visual notation was Goldstine and von Neumann's program fl owcharts, developed in the 1940s, and the ancestor of all modern SE visual notations […] This pattern continues to the present day with UML, the industry standard SE language, defi ned as "a visual language for visualising, specifying, constructing and documenting software intensive systems" [3] .
Unifi ed Modeling Language (UML) [4, 5] has been utilized in modeling systems. In this regard, Moody and Hillegersberg [4] This paper introduces a foundation for a general diagrammatic apparatus for modeling systems [referred to as the Flowthing Model (FM)] and, without loss of generality, contrasts it with the diagrammatic tools used in UML; however, in contrast to Moody and Hillegersberg's [4] criticism of UML which is based on the criteria of visual notation, this paper claims that UML additionally suffers from lack of an underlying unifying notion that ties together the rhythm and continuity of the narratives embedded in the sequence of modeled events. FM is built on the basic concept of fl ow that interweaves various streams to maintain continuity across parts and along the conceptual representation. 'Flow' here refers to the fl ow of things, as in the specifi cation of fl ows of electricity, water, gas, and signals (e.g. telephone lines), added to the blueprint of a high-rise building.
Furthermore, in this paper, contrasting FM with UML is achieved by concentrating on modeling of security attacks. Information security attack modeling has been developed in various forms (e.g. attack trees, use cases, misuse cases, scenarios, and asset analysis [6] ) and has been applied for many purposes (e.g. security requirements specifi cation and identifi cation of commonly occurring attack patterns). As a sample method of description, attack trees are used to analyze attacks through identifi cation of security vulnerabilities and of compromises caused by attackers. An attack tree represents a damaging event. Branches of the tree elaborate the methods by which that event could occur.
In many attack-related studies, the focus of analysis is on improving decision making. Information is analyzed and combined with existing knowledge to produce a model for decision making. Decision making is an important factor in the construction of a rationality-based model that allows choosing from alternatives by moving through a series of steps. In contrast, the approach in this paper provides a descriptive model encapsulating structured knowledge captured from the phenomenon of attacking. 'Descriptive' here refers to identifying the progression of an attack through its various phases. This type of model facilitates understanding of and communication about the notion of attack.
Also, because of the generality of the problem of diagrammatically representing security attacks, this paper concentrates on the specifi c problem of modeling security attacks in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) medium access control (MAC) layer [7] . This fi eld is selected because of the availability of recently published (2012) research that models attacks using a UML sequence diagram [8] , indicating that UML methodology is the current method for this type of problem.
Additionally, WSN security is more complex in comparison with traditional network security, because of computational constraints of the nodes, conservative energy requirements, and an unpredictable communication channel and unattended operations [9] . Developing security mechanisms to protect WSNs requires understanding attacks through some type of modeling [10] .
While maintaining general applicability, this paper focuses on a specifi c research study that utilizes only UML sequence diagrams to represent security attacks in WSNs. Such a particular example of attacks in a specifi c fi eld using a defi nite diagrammatic method provides an opportunity to contrast the features of FM against sequence diagrams representative of UML.
Section 2 describes the focus of this paper, modeling of security attacks, specifi cally the problem of modeling security attacks in WSNs. This is followed in Section 3 by a summary of the main features of the FM as applied to modeling of attacks in WSNs. In Section 4, a collision attack in such a network is represented in FM. Section 5 provides general conclusions and further work in this area.
2 WSN: PROBLEM A WSN consists of specially distributed nodes with sensors, which can perform the monitoring of physical or environmental conditions (e.g. temperature, sound, pressure) by communicating with each other [11] . They are used in applications such as military applications (battlefi eld surveillance), industrial process monitoring and control, machine health monitoring, home automation, and intelligent transportation [12] .
WSN requires protection to preserve the confi dentiality and integrity of sensitive information, and availability of the system. Pawar et al. [7] used sequence diagrams to study WSN security by addressing the behavioral modeling of MAC security attacks in order to make the design of the layer protocols more effi cient and secure. The MAC layer is important for the operation of a WSN since it regulates energy consumption, channel utilization, and network delay [13] .
Current research in WSN security has focused less on security on the MAC security. However, understanding the behaviour of MAC security attacks is important in order to develop secure mechanisms for the MAC layer […] . Little research has been done in UML modeling of a WSN environment especially concerning the security [7] .
According to Pawar et al. [7] , UML has been chosen for analysis of security attack behavior [8] because it represents a well-known and standard methodology for modeling real-world objects. It also refl ects the best engineering practices that have been utilized in modeling large and complex systems. Pawar et al. [7] then use the sequential diagram approach of UML to depict six known types of attack: collision attack, unintelligent replay attack, unauthenticated broadcast attack, full domination attack, exhaustion attack, and intelligent jamming attack.
This paper proposes to redraw these attacks in terms of FM in order to demonstrate that the proposed FM diagrammatic method can capture the interweaving of different events using the notion of fl ow. FM can be applied to most current diagramming methodologies as a tool for high-level specifi cations, as demonstrated in several previous publications (e.g. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] ).
For the sake of a self-contained paper, the next section briefl y reviews FM; meanwhile, the example using the RTS/CTS protocol, also shown in the next section, is a new contribution.
FLOWTHING MODEL
The FM was inspired by many types of fl ows that exist in diverse fi elds, such as, for example, supply chain fl ows, money fl ows, and data fl ows in communication models. This model is a diagrammatic schema that uses 'fl owthings'. A fl owthing is a thing that can be released, transferred, received, processed (in form), and created. For example, in communication, data are a fl owthing that is released and transferred by the source, received in the destination, and processed (translated from one format to another), and this causes the creation of another piece of data (e.g. response). FM depicts processes using 'fl owsystems' (Fig. 1) that comprise six stages, as follows:
Arrive: A fl owthing reaches a new fl owsystem (e.g. a data arrival buffer in a router). Accepted: A fl owthing is permitted to enter the system (e.g. no wrong address for a delivery); if arriving fl owthings are also always accepted, Arrive and Accept can be combined as a Received stage. Processed (changed): The fl owthing goes through some kind of transformation that changes its form but not its identity (e.g. compressed, colored, etc.). Released: A fl owthing is marked as ready to be transferred outside the system (e.g. airline passengers waiting to board). Created: A new fl owthing is born (created) in the system (a data mining program generates a conclusion). Transferred: The fl owthing is transported to or from somewhere outside the fl owsystem (e.g. packets reaching ports in a router, but still not in the arrival buffer).
These stages are mutually exclusive (i.e. a fl owthing in the Process stage cannot be in the Create stage or the Release stage at the same time). An additional stage of 'Storage' can also be added to any FM model to represent the storage of fl owthings; however, storage is not a generic stage because there can be stored processed fl owthings, stored created fl owthings, etc. Hereafter, a thing means a fl owthing.
A fl owsystem depicts the internal fl ows of fl owthings in a system with the six stages and transactions among them. FM also uses the following notions:
Spheres and subspheres: These are the environments of the fl owthing. A sphere can have multiple fl owsystems in its structure if needed. A sphere can be an entity (e.g. a company, a customer), a location (a laboratory, a waiting room), and communication media (a channel, a wire). A fl owsystem is a subsphere that embodies the fl ow and has no subsphere itself.
In this paper, it is assumed that the control of the movement of fl owthings is embedded inside the stages (e.g. in Process: if a fl owthing fi ts a certain criterion, then it fl ows to Release). In principle, there should be no diffi culties in conceptualizing such a control at the edges, in the manner of Petri nets. A fl owsystem may not need to include all the stages; for example, an archiving system might use only the stages Arrive, Accept, and Release. Multiple systems captured by FM can interact with each other by triggering events related to one another in their spheres and stages. Triggering can also be used for events such as starting a fl ow system (e.g. outside start-up signal).
Example:
The MAC layer in 802.11 standards, where transmission in a wireless node performs the following sequence, summarized from [19]:
Step 1: The sender checks whether the medium is idle or not; if so, after the Distributed Inter Frame Space (DIFS) units of time, it broadcasts a Request-to-Send (RTS) frame to the receiver address.
Step 2: The receiver waits for a Short Inter Frame Space (SIFS) unit of time; then it responds to the sender with a Clear-to-Send (CTS) frame.
Step 3: The sender receives the CTS frame; then it waits for another SIFS unit of time before sending the data frame to the receiver.
Step 4: Finally, when the receiver successfully receives the data frame, it waits for an SIFS unit of time and also returns an Acknowledgement (ACK) message to the sender. Figure 2 shows how data are exchanged using RTC/CTS protocol. Figure 3 shows the corresponding FM representation. There are two spheres: sender and receiver. Each sphere includes four fl owsystem subspheres: RTS, CTS, FRAME (data), and ACK; thus, the sender and receiver handle these four fl owthings by creating, receiving, processing, releasing, and transferring. It is possible to replace 'Create' with retrieval of RTS from storage if RTS is not constructed (Fig. 4) .
In Fig. 3 , the sender creates an RTS (circle A in Fig. 3 ), then releases it (B). Releasing means being marked for transmission, but the RTS is not actually transferred; thus, this is the suitable place for DIFS (time delay not shown in the fi gure). The RTS fl ows to the receiver (C), where it is received and processed (D) to trigger (E) the creation of a CTS (F). The CTS fl ows to the sender (G) to be processed (H), triggering (I) the creation (J) of a FRAME. The FRAME fl ows to the receiver (K), where it is processed (L) and triggers (M) the creation of an ACK (N), which fl ows to the sender (O).
Each stage in the fl owsystem can include all types of features such as constraints synchronization and operational aspects, as illustrated with some examples in Fig. 5 .
In the FM-based depiction, a complete semantic picture of the communication phenomenon, the sender and receiver can generate (create), process, release, receive, and transfer data, not merely send and receive. Messages trigger each other and are 'physically' connected (solid and dashed arrows), not just with implicit time-sequenced connections. Additionally, the fl ows of fl owthings (RTS, CTS, FRAME, and ACK) are clearly separated or connected by dashed arrows. The representation also embeds a great deal of semantic material that can be used to describe dynamism and control (e.g. constraints, Fig. 5 ). Yet, the FM representation is characterized by simplicity provided by the repeated application of fl owsystems.
COLLISION ATTACK
In this type of attack, a malicious node causes collisions with the transmissions of neighboring nodes by sending a short noise packet, thus causing a great deal of disruption in the network operation [20] . Pawar et al. [7] describe the events of this type of attack as follows:
• An external attacker initiates a collision attack through malicious node 3.
• Once the attack is initiated on node 3, it will start to send noise packets to all nodes in the network. It will increase traffi c in the network, causing the channel to become busy as it performs this activity. • Node 1 detects an event and sends an RTS packet to node 2. At the same time, the malicious node 3 also generates a noise packet and forwards it to node 2. Both packets will reach node 2 simultaneously and cause a collision.
• Again, node 1 detects the event and checks channel availability by exchanging RTS ( request to send) and CTS (clear to send) with node 2. Once node 1 receives a CTS from node 2, node 1 starts to send data packets toward node 2. If, at the same time, malicious node 3 also sends noise packets toward node 2, collisions will happen in the network.
• Malicious node 3 is continuously generating noise packets that try to use the channel so a collision will take place. This collision of packets leads to retransmission of the packets, which in turn leads to increasing energy consumption [7] . Figure 6 shows a partial picture of the corresponding sequence diagram given by Pawar et al. [7] . Notice how semantically disturbing the sequence diagram is; for example, the same type of a symbol -a solid arrow -simultaneously represents (1) an attack, (2) different types of fl ows, and (3) detection of events. Also, the sequence diagram mixes different types of collisions, as will be clear next, thus making it diffi cult to understand the attack. Figure 7 shows the FM-based logical map of fl ows in the four-node situation in this example. The following discussion aims at furthering understanding of the events related to the attack. Figure 7 includes the four nodes and the fl owthings that are transmitted between them: FRAMES (noise or data), RTSs, and CTSs. It is assumed that the noise is of type 'data' (noise FRAME) because it is generated by a user (the hacker), not by the system, as in the case of RTS and CTS. Figure 7 depicts only the fl ows described in the sequence diagram of Fig. 6 . Later in this paper, a more complete representation will be developed.
• Node 3 creates and sends noise to nodes 1 (circle A), 2 (B), and 4 (C).
• Node 1 sends RTS to node 2 (D).
• A collision occurs between RTS (D) and noise passing from node 3 to node 2 (B). • Node 1 sends RTS to node 2 (D) again.
• Node 2 sends CTS to node 1 (E).
• Node 1 sends FRAME: data packet (F).
• A collision occurs between FRAME (F) and noise passing from node 3 to node 2 (B). This collision is shown in Fig. 7 
(G).
It can be observed that the sequence diagram in Fig. 6 is only a partial diagram, because collisions occur between all messages sent by all nodes to all other nodes. The scenario of Fig. 6 include only a few instances of these collisions. If all occurrences of collision were depicted, the sequence diagram would be very long.
Furthermore, the sequence diagram depicts a single type of collision (e.g. collision between RTS and noise) between noise and FRAME, rather than collisions among messages. Thus, in Fig. 7 , collisions between different fl owthings (e.g. FRAMES and RTS) do not appear. This does not help in understanding the total picture of the attack, especially the logical 'location' of the attack, as will become clear next.
The reason for treating all fl owthings as a single type in the sequence diagram is that the communication system, for practical reasons, does not distinguish among different types of messages (fl owthings). Accordingly, Fig. 7 is redrawn as Fig. 8 to distinguish between internal senders/receivers and the system that performs the actual communication. In the new Fig. 8 , node 2 has a single (logical) interface (fl owsystem) with the communication system (circles A, B, and C). Upon receiving a message (regardless of whether it is RTS, CTS, or FRAME) from outside, the communication system of node 2 processes it and directs it to the appropriate application or system program. Similarly, upon receiving a message (regardless of whether it is RTS, CTS, or FRAME), it sends it to the appropriate outside party. While each internal fl owsystem handles one type of fl owthing, the communication module handles all types as messages; hence, collisions can occur among these messages regardless of their nature.
Note that the communication channel could be drawn as a sphere with fl owsystems installed among nodes in the FM description, but those fl owsystems would be irrelevant to the depiction of the attack under discussion.
Even though the FM in Figs 7 and 8 follows the sequence diagram in the given particular occurrence of an attack where a collision appears in the communication between nodes 1 and 2, this is not a general modeling of this type of attack. To make the model broader, it is assumed that the network consists of n nodes plus one malicious node. Figure 9 shows the resultant FM representation of the collision attack.
The hacker (A) sends noise to the communication module of the malicious node (it is possible to model the situation such that the hacker takes over the communication module). Accordingly, the malicious node starts bombarding other nodes with noise (B). Focusing on node 2, the fi gure shows this node receiving a stream of noise (C). With this constant noise reaching node 2 (D), there is a high probability of collisions (E), with messages arriving from node 1 (F), node 3 (G), and other nodes. Node 2, itself, contributes to the problem by sending messages (RTS, CTS, FRAMES, etc.) coming from different applications and system programs (H) to node 1 (I), node 3 (J), and other nodes. Figure 9 certainly presents a more complete conceptual picture, for the purpose of understanding the collision attack, than a sketch such as a sequence diagram. Suppose it is required to model the event in the sequence diagram (Fig. 6 ), where 13: Send Data Packets (denoted as FRAME), sent from node 1 to node 2, collides with 15: Send Noise Packets, sent from the malicious node to node 2. Figure 10 shows the depiction of this event.
In the fi gure, node 1 sends RTS (A), which fl ows to node 2 (B) to arrive at its RTS fl owsystem (C). The request is processed to trigger (D) the creation of CTS (E), which fl ows to node 1 (F) to be received by the fl owsystem of CTS (G). There, it is processed to trigger (H) Figure 9 : General model of the collision attack. the creation of FRAME (I). The data frame fl ows to node 2 (J) to arrive simultaneously with the noise fl owing from the malicious node (K), causing collision (L).
CONCLUSION
Recently, UML sequence diagrams have been used to model security attacks (e.g. collision attacks and unintelligent replay attacks) in WSNs. This paper describes an alternative fl owbased approach (FM) for visualizing security attacks in terms of depicting behavioral interactions. It models security attacks in WSNs and contrasts this model with the sequencebased diagrammatic method.
The comparison provides an initial appraisal of the FM method with reference to the wellknown UML process modeling methodology. It is shown that modeling using sequence diagrams is semantically disturbing, for example, where the same type of a symbol-a solid arrow-simultaneously represents (1) an attack, (2) different types of fl ows, and (3) detection of events detection. The sequence diagram also mixes different notions, such as types of collisions, thus making it diffi cult to understand the attack.
The results indicate that the FM diagrammatic method can capture the interweaving of different events in the attacks to achieve a more complete picture necessary for better understanding. The FM representation of attack progression can be applied to modeling different types of computer and communication attacks. Based on FM conceptualization, it is possible to characterize weak points and develop a map of vulnerabilities in the system. Such a methodology provides a base for analysis in the fi elds of threat modeling and secure software development.
Further work would model different types of attacks in FM and apply the resulting model to description of actual computer attacks. Another aim is to utilize the FM representation of attacks in other applications, such as in design of protection strategies and development of security policies. 
